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SUMMARY 
In the safety literature it has been argued, that in a complex socio-technical 
system safety cannot be well analysed by event sequence based approaches, but 
requires to capture the complex interactions and performance variability of the 
socio-technical system. In order to evaluate the quantitative and practical 
consequences of these arguments, this study compares two approaches to 
assess accident risk of an example safety critical sociotechnical system. It 
contrasts an event sequence based assessment with a multi-agent dynamic risk 
model (MA-DRM) based assessment, both of which are performed for a particular 
runway incursion scenario. The event sequence analysis uses the well-known 
event tree modelling formalism and the MA-DRM based approach combines 
agent based modelling, hybrid Petri nets and rare event Monte Carlo simulation. 
The comparison addresses qualitative and quantitative differences in the 
methods, attained risk levels, and in the prime factors influencing the safety of 
the operation. The assessments show considerable differences in the accident 
risk implications of the performance of human operators and technical systems 
in the runway incursion scenario. In contrast with the event sequence based 
results, the MA-DRM based results show that the accident risk is not manifest 
from the performance of and relations between individual human operators and 
technical systems. Instead, the safety risk emerges from the totality of the 
performance and interactions in the agent based model of the safety critical 
operation considered, which coincides very well with the argumentation in the 
safety literature.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The man-made disasters theory of Turner [1] gives early descriptions of how the 
objective of safely operating technological systems could be subverted by normal 
organizational processes due to unintended and complex interactions between 
contributory preconditions. Also Perrow [2] describes accidents as the 
consequence of complex interactions and tight couplings in sociotechnical 
systems in his normal accident theory. Building forward on the notion of normal 
accidents, Hollnagel [3] argues that performance in sociotechnical systems is 
necessarily variable due to the performance variability of its entities and the 
complexity of their interactions. Dekker [4] uses complex systems theory to 
qualitatively discuss safety in complex organizations and accidents as emergent 
properties.   
 
In order to cope quantitatively with the challenge of safety risk assessment for a 
complex sociotechnical system, Zio [5] has performed a systematic analysis of 
the various issues that have to be addressed. Based on this analysis, Zio [5] 
identifies a need for a methodology that integrates dynamic and stochastic 
behaviour and that automatically generates various scenarios through dynamic 
simulation. Such methodologies use models of controlled process dynamics and 
human operator behaviour during safety-relevant scenarios, and simulation 
techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the models. Advantages 
of a dynamic simulation approach indicated by Zio are (1) the identification of a 
broad range of accident scenarios, (2) the exclusion of oversimplifying 
assumptions about process evolution, since processes are simulated directly by 
dynamic models, and (3) the retrieval of additional information on time-
dependent probability density functions of process states from the analysis.  
 
In spite of these valuable views on safety of complex sociotechnical systems, it 
still is common practice to adopt  classical event sequence based approaches for 
safety assessment. Such classical approaches use sequential cause-effect 
propagation of technical failures, human errors, contextual conditions and 
conflict resolving actions to model the development of accidents. Well-known 
techniques are fault trees and event trees, which represent relations between 
event occurrences and use event probabilities to achieve quantification of risk 
levels [6]. An advantage of these techniques is that the resulting tree structure is 
easy to understand by a large audience, but recognized limitations include the 
difficulty to represent the dynamics and interdependencies between entities of 
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safety relevant scenarios, and their limited account of human performance [3, 7, 
8]. If the argumentations by [1-5] are correct, then one should expect that the 
adoption of an event sequence based approach for a safety risk assessment of a 
complex sociotechnical system would have significant impact on its outcomes. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate this expectation by conducting a systematic 
comparison between an event sequence based approach and an advanced 
dynamic simulation based approach, both applied to the same safety critical air 
traffic control (ATC) example scenario.  
 
The safety critical ATC example is a runway incursion scenario in the context of  
an active runway crossing operation. A runway incursion is defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as “Any occurrence at an 
aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on 
the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of 
aircraft” [9]. Within air traffic, runway incursion is recognised as an important 
safety issue [9, 10].  
 
The development of the event sequence and MA-DRM based safety assessment 
approaches for the runway incursion scenario stemmed from a need to conduct a 
safety risk assessment of an active runway crossing operation at Amsterdam 
airport; these developments have been reported in preceding studies [11-13]. 
The design of this active runway crossing operation included an ATC alert 
system, which was aimed at minimizing the risk of runway incursions. During the 
development of the infrastructure and the operational concept for the active 
runway crossing operation, a series of risk assessment studies has been 
conducted [14]. Initial safety studies included event sequence based  safety risk 
assessment  of various safety relevant scenarios of the active runway crossing 
operation [11]. Having recognized the difficulty in capturing the complexity of 
possible runway incursion within the active runway crossing example,  [12, 13]  
developed a MA-DRM approach for this very same scenario. Because both 
approaches have been developed for the same runway incursion scenario, and 
under the very same set of identified hazards, the approaches and results of 
these two studies provide a suitable basis for the comparison of event sequence 
and MA-DRM based risk assessment approaches for a complex safety critical 
socio-technical system example.  
 
The comparison in this paper focuses on the risk of an accident in the runway 
incursion scenario as assessed by both approaches. It  addresses differences in 
the methods, differences in the risk results attained and differences in the 
understanding of the factors influencing the safety of the operation. The 
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comparison is backed-up by dedicated simulations of the model of [13], which 
provide additional insights in the relation between the accident risk and events in 
the scenario, and the effect of the roles of agents in the scenario on the accident 
risk. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the active runway 
crossing considered. Section 3 describes the methods and results of the event 
sequence based safety assessment of the runway incursion scenario. Section 4 
introduces the MA-DRM based safety assessment approach. Section 5 describes 
the application of the MA-DRM based safety assessment of the runway incursion 
scenario. Section 6 compares the methods and results of both approaches. 
Section 7 provides a discussion of the implications of the differences identified 
between the two approaches. 
 
Parts of the results in this paper have been presented in conference papers [15-
17].  
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2 ACTIVE RUNWAY CROSSING OPERATION 
In the runway incursion scenario considered, an aircraft is taking off and a 
taxiing aircraft is crossing the runway while it should not; thus the runway 
incursion is due to the taxiing aircraft. It may occur in the context of the active 
runway crossing operation depicted in Figure 1. The runway is used for 
departures and has a taxiway that crosses the runway at a distance of 1000 m 
from the runway threshold. The runway crossing has stopbars that are remotely 
controlled by the runway controller. The scenario considered is under good 
visibility conditions.  
 
ground control sector
ground control sector
runway control sector153 m
1000 m
x
y
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the traffic situation considered. The taking-off aircraft 
accelerates along the runway while the crew of the taxiing aircraft intends to proceed 
along the taxiway towards the active runway. 
 
The main human operators involved in the runway crossing operation are the 
pilots of the taking-off aircraft, the pilots of the taxiing aircraft, the runway 
controller and the ground controllers responsible for traffic on nearby taxiways. 
The pilots are responsible for safe conduct of the flight operations and should 
actively monitor for potential conflicting traffic situations. The runway controller 
is responsible for safe and efficient traffic handling on the runway and the 
runway crossings; the ground controllers are responsible for the traffic on the 
taxiways in the surroundings of the runway. 
 
Standard communication, navigation and surveillance systems are used: 
communication between controllers and crews is by radio/telecommunication 
(R/T) systems, the pilots use their knowledge on the aerodrome layout and/or 
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their maps for taxiing, and ground radar tracking data of all aircraft and 
sufficiently large vehicles on the airport surface is shown on displays of the 
runway and ground controllers. The ATC system may generate two types of alerts 
to warn the runway controller: (1) a stopbar violation alert for the situation that 
an aircraft crosses an active stopbar in the direction of the runway, and (2) a 
runway incursion alert for the situation that an aircraft is on the runway in front 
of an aircraft that has initiated to take off.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
6 
 
NLR-TP-2013-284 
July 2013   
 
3 EVENT SEQUENCE BASED SAFETY STUDY OF 
THE RUNWAY INCURSION SCENARIO 
This section describes the event tree that was developed for the runway incursion 
scenario and its risk results. Section 3.1 presents the structure of the developed 
event tree. Section 3.2 presents the quantification of the event tree. Section 3.3 
presents an analysis of the accident risk reduction achieved by pilots, controller 
and ATC alert system.  
3.1 EVENT TREE 
The developed event tree is shown in Figure 2. The starting event 0Q  in this tree 
is the situation that the taxiing aircraft starts crossing while it should not. The 
crossing is initiated by the pilots without contacting the runway controller, e.g. 
due to a misunderstanding of the ground controller. Subsequent events in this 
tree capture possible contributions to resolution of the runway incursion conflict 
by the pilots of both aircraft directly or following a call by the runway controller, 
who may have recognized the conflict directly or via an alert. The branching 
points in the event tree differentiate between early, medium and late recognition 
of the conflict by the pilots and the runway controller; early, medium and late 
communication between the controller and the pilots; and early and medium-
timed alerts warning the controller (events 1Q to 12Q ). This approach was chosen 
as a systematic means to get hold on the variety in the timing of conflict 
detection and resolution events by the human operators in combination with the 
timing of the alerts and the remaining braking distance. Figure 2 shows that 
there are 27 event sequences S1 to S27. The outcomes of these event sequences 
are classified in the categories “No conflict”, “Early resolution”, “Medium 
resolution”, “Late resolution” and “Accident”. Figure 2 shows that there are six 
event sequences that lead to an accident between the two aircraft. 
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3.2 QUANTIFICATION OF THE EVENT TREE 
Quantification of an event tree such as  in Figure 2 implies evaluation of the 
probabilities of the event sequences. For instance, the probability of event 
sequence 3S (early resolution of the conflict following early recognition and 
communication by the controller) is evaluated as  
 
3 0 1 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 2
5 0 1 2 3
( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | , ) ( | , , )
( | , , , )
P S P Q P Q Q P Q Q Q P Q Q Q Q
P Q Q Q Q Q
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅
  (1) 
Note that the event probabilities are conditional upon prior events in the tree. 
For instance, the probability of event 3Q  is conditional on the occurrence of 0Q  
and the non-occurrence of 1Q  and 2Q : 3 0 1 2( | , , )P Q Q Q Q , meaning the 
probability that the controller recognizes the conflict at an early stage, given 
there is an aircraft crossing while it should not, there is an aircraft in take-off and 
the conflict has not been recognized and resolved at an early stage by the pilots. 
 
Table 1: Estimated lower and upper bounds of event probabilities, which are obtained by 
expert elicitation and are used in the quantification of the event tree of Figure 2. 
Event Event probability 
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
1Q  No aircraft in take-off 0.75 0.75 
2Q  Pilots recognize conflict at early stage 0.5 0.7 
3Q  Controller recognizes conflict at early stage 0.1 0.2 
4Q  Alert system warns controller at early stage 0.95 0.99 
5Q  Communication leads to resolution at early stage 0.8 0.9 
6Q  
Pilots recognize and resolve conflict at medium 
stage 
0.9 0.99 
7Q  Controller recognizes conflict at medium stage 0.2 0.4 
8Q  Alert system warns controller at medium stage 0.9 0.99 
9Q  
Communication leads to resolution at medium 
stage 
0.6 0.8 
10Q  Pilots recognize and resolve conflict at late stage 0.9 0.99 
11Q  Controller recognizes conflict at late stage 0.5 0.75 
12Q  Communication leads to resolution at late stage 0.4 0.6 
 
In the event sequence based assessment, lower and upper bounds of the event 
probabilities were estimated by expert (controller and pilot) elicitation [11]. In 
particular, interviews were conducted in which the runway incursion scenarios 
were discussed with the experts and their opinions were asked about the 
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frequency of events in these scenarios. The thus found ranges of the event 
probabilities are shown in Table 1. Depending on the agent and the 
early/medium/late stage, the probabilities of the events (leading to resolution of 
the conflict) are in the range of 0.1 to 0.99. It can be noticed that the 
communication-related events 5Q , 9Q  and 12Q , and the pilot recognition-related 
events 6Q and 10Q are used at multiple places in the event tree and that the 
probabilities of these events have been assumed to be the same, irrespective of 
the preceding chain of events. 
 
Using these event probabilities in the event tree structure of Figure 2, the 
probabilities of the event sequences  in the scenario are computed. For each of 
the outcome categories, the following conditional probabilities given the runway 
incursion are shown in Table 2: (1) a lower bound , which is based on the upper 
bounds of the event probabilities of Table 1, (2) an upper bound, which is based 
on the lower bounds of the event probabilities of Table 1, and (3) a geometric 
mean of these bounds. The geometric mean is calculated to support the 
comparison with the risk point estimate obtained by the MA-DRM and it assumes 
a multiplicative uncertainty range (i.e. a same factor above and below the 
geometric mean).  
 
Table 2: Conditional probabilities given the runway incursion scenario per event tree 
outcome category, which are the sums of the probabilities of the related event 
sequences. For each category, the lower and upper bounds and their geometric mean 
are shown.  
Event tree outcome 
category 
Related event 
sequences 
Probability 
Lower 
bound 
Geometric 
mean 
Upper 
bound 
No conflict S1 7.5 E-1 7.5 E-1 7.5 E-1 
Early resolution S2, S3, S9  2.2 E-1 2.3 E-1 2.4 E-1 
Medium resolution S4, S5, S10, S11, S15, S16, S20 8.0 E-3 1.5 E-2 2.8 E-2 
Late resolution 
S
6
, S
7
, S
12
, S
13
, S
17
, S
18
, S
21
, 
S
22
, S
24
, S
25 
1.6 E-5 1.3 E-4 1.1 E-3 
Accident S8, S14,S19, S22, S26, S27 6.5 E-8 2.2 E-6 7.3 E-5 
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3.3 ACCIDENT RISK REDUCTION CONTRIBUTIONS OF ENTITIES IN THE 
EVENT TREE 
To obtain a better insight in the accident risk reduction contributions of the alert 
system, the controller and the pilots, the accident risks of the event tree (Figure 
2) are calculated for cases where one or several of these entities do not timely 
detect the conflict. These conditions are achieved as follows: 
• The alert system does not timely warn the controller, is achieved by setting 
the probability of events 4Q and 8Q to zero.  
• The controller does not recognize the conflict him/herself, is achieved by 
setting the probability of events 3Q , 7Q  and 11Q to zero. 
• The pilots do not recognize the conflict themselves, is achieved by setting 
the probability of events 2Q , 6Q  and 10Q  to zero. 
The geometric mean of the conditional probability of an accident given the 
runway incursion scenario is shown in Figure 3 for each of the eight possible 
combinations of these conditions. Figure 3 also presents for each combination of 
conditions, the risk increase factor with respect to the case evaluated in Section 
3.2 (referred to as case B1), where all entities contribute to detection and 
resolution of the conflict.     
Figure 3: Conditional accident risk results of the event tree in Figure 2 for various cases 
where the alert system, the controller and the pilots can (filled box) or cannot (open box) 
independently detect a conflict. The value on top of each bar is the risk increase factor 
with respect to case B1.   
Alert system
Controller
Pilots
1
19.0
1.04
2580
44.5
49000
2670
115000
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The results given in Figure 3 show that according to the event sequence based 
safety assessment, the accident risk is reduced very strongly (by a factor 
115,000, see case B8) by the combined contributions of the pilots, controller and 
alert system. The results given in Figure 3 also show that the pilots have by far 
the largest contribution in reduction of the accident risk (by a factor 2580, case 
B4). The alert system leads to a considerable risk reduction by a factor 19.0 (case 
B2), or even by a factor 44.5 in the case that the controller would not detect 
conflicts him/herself (case B5). The controller makes relatively small 
contributions to reduction of the accident risk: by a factor 1.04 if the controller is 
supported by the alert system (case B3) and by a factor 2.35 if the controller is 
not supported by the alert system (as follows from a comparison of the accident 
risk of cases B5 and B2). These small risk reductions by the controller are in line 
with the small probability values of events 3Q , 7Q ,and 11Q  (see Table 1), which 
reflect the assumption made in the event sequence based study, that as the pilot 
of the taxiing aircraft starts crossing without contacting the runway controller, 
the runway controller is not very likely to timely observe the conflict by own 
visual monitoring.  
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4 MULTI-AGENT DYNAMIC RISK MODEL 
BASED APPROACH 
The MA-DRM based assessment approach has been developed as the quantitative 
part of the Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ) methodology 
for the analysis of accident risk in ATM [13, 18, 19]. The MA-DRM based 
assessment approach makes use of an agent based model (ABM) that is 
embedded in a stochastic analysis framework. The ABM approach is described in 
Section 2.1. The stochastic analysis framework is described in Section 2.2. Next 
Section 2.3 describes a Petri net approach toward specifying an ABM in the 
stochastic analysis framework. Section 2.4 explains how the stochastic analysis 
framework is exploited to conduct rare event Monte Carlo simulations with the 
Petri net based model. Finally Section 2.5 describes how differences between the 
Petri net based model and reality are taken into account in the MA-DRM based 
risk assessment. 
4.1 AGENT BASED MODELLING AND SIMULATION 
The sociotechnical system views of [1-4] match very well with the complexity 
science view that in systems of multiple agents, behaviour may emerge from the 
interactions between these agents. Hence, ABM approaches have been used for 
the analysis of a variety of sociotechnical systems [20], including evacuation 
induced traffic flows, stock markets, organizational design, and diffusion and 
adoption of innovation. The benefits of ABM over other modelling techniques are 
captured by Bonabeau [20] in three statements: (i) ABM captures emergent 
phenomena; (ii) ABM provides a natural description of a system; and (iii) ABM is 
flexible. In [21] it is further argued that an ABM approach is well suited for 
applications involving interactions between functionally or geographically 
distributed autonomous subsystems. This makes ABM simulation a logical choice 
for the evaluation of future advanced ATC designs. For example, Shah et al. [22] 
showed that ABM simulation offers the capability to integrate cognitive and 
technological models that interact in an ATC environment. Simulation of such 
interacting models can predict the results of transformations in procedures and 
technology and such emergent behaviour typically cannot be found by examining 
the behaviour of the individual agents alone.  
 
In the development of an MA-DRM approach within the TOPAZ methodology, an 
ABM has explicitly been embraced in [12] in order to extend the human directed 
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situation awareness (SA) model of Endsley [23] to a multi-agent SA propagation 
model, which covers both human and technical agents. The motivation for 
developing this extension was twofold: 1) Endsley [24] showed that more than 
60% of the causal factors underlying aircraft accidents involving major air carriers 
in USA involved problems with proper SA; and 2) TOPAZ experience showed that 
many hazards in multi-agent ATM operations stem from SA inconsistencies 
between agents. The multi-agent SA model of [12] makes explicit that in a multi-
agent system, SA propagates from one agent to another agent, during which 
errors may sneak in the SA’s of the agents without being noticed by any of the 
agents.    
4.2 STOCHASTIC HYBRID AUTOMATA 
In an ABM simulation, a collision between a pair of aircraft occurs when the joint 
state of the simulated aircraft hits a critical subset of their joint state space. In 
systems theory, the estimation of the probability of reaching a given subset of 
the state space within a given time period is known as a problem of probabilistic 
reachability analysis, e.g. [25]. Because of the huge dimensionality of a multi-
agent model of a complex sociotechnical system, existing probabilistic 
reachability approaches, e.g. [26], fall short for determining the accident risk.  
 
In safety-critical industries (e.g., nuclear, chemical), reachability analysis is 
addressed by methods that are known as dynamical approaches towards 
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), e.g. [27]. These dynamical PRA methods 
represent the dynamic evolution between discrete events by ordinary differential 
equations. In stochastic control theory these are known as piecewise 
deterministic Markov process [28, 29]. For safety modelling of air traffic 
operations, it may as well be needed to incorporate Brownian motion in the 
piecewise deterministic Markov process model, e.g. to represent the effect of 
random wind disturbances on aircraft trajectories [30].  
 
The class of systems which incorporates Brownian motion within piecewise 
deterministic Markov processes, has been defined as a stochastic hybrid 
automaton [31]. Such automaton has a hybrid state consisting of two 
components: a continuous valued state component and a discrete valued state 
component. The continuous state evolves according to a stochastic differential 
equation (SDE), where the vector field and drift factor depend on both hybrid 
state components. Switching from one discrete state to another discrete state is 
governed by a probability law or occurs when the continuous state hits a pre-
specified boundary. Whenever a switching occurs, the hybrid state is reset 
instantly to a new state according to a probability measure which depends itself 
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on the past hybrid state. Complementary dynamic and stochastic effects are 
induced by the interaction between the hybrid state components. A key quality of 
this type of stochastic hybrid automaton is that it generates a process, which is 
named generalised stochastic hybrid process (GSHP), and for which it has been 
proven that it satisfies the strong Markov property [32, 33].  
4.3 PETRI NET BASED SPECIFICATION OF A GSHP 
For the modelling of accident risk of safety-critical operations in nuclear and 
chemical industries, the most advanced approaches use Petri nets as model 
specification formalism, and stochastic analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to 
evaluate the specified model [27]. Since their introduction as a systematic way to 
specify large discrete event systems, Petri nets have shown their usefulness for 
many practical applications in different industries, e.g. [34]. Various types of 
Petri net modelling have also found their way into reliability and safety  
applications, e.g. [35-38]. 
 
Although Petri nets have much in common with automata, there also are 
significant differences. Cassandras and Lafortune [39] explain that both Petri 
nets and automata have their specific advantages. Petri net is more powerful in 
the development of a model of a complex system, whereas automata are more 
powerful in supporting analysis. In order to combine the advantages offered by 
both approaches, there is need for a systematic way of transforming a Petri net 
model into an automata model. Such a transformation would allow using Petri 
nets for the specification and automata for the analysis. For a timed or stochastic 
Petri net with a bounded number of tokens and deterministic or Poisson process 
firing, such a transformation exists [39].  
 
A Petri net consists of places (drawn as circles) and transitions (drawn as 
squares), which are connected by arcs (drawn as directed arrows). The places 
represent discrete states; a token (drawn as a black dot) in a place represents 
that discrete state to be currently active.  The transitions can remove tokens from 
places and produce tokens for places in the direction of the arcs, representing 
jumps between discrete states. In order to make this basic Petri net formalism 
useful for modelling of air traffic operations, we need various extensions, 
including a one-to-one transformation to the stochastic hybrid automaton setting 
of GSHP. Jensen [40] introduced the extension of attaching a colour to each 
token in a Petri net, where the colour assumes values from a finite set. Tokens 
and the attached colours determine which transitions are enabled. Upon firing by 
a transition, new tokens and attached colours are produced as a function of the 
removed tokens and colours. Haas [41] extended this colour idea to 
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(stochastically) timed Petri nets where the time period between enabling and 
firing depends of the input tokens and their attached colours. Both in [40, 41], a 
colour does not change as long as the token to which it is attached remains at its 
place. Everdij and Blom [42, 43] defined a dynamically coloured Petri net (DCPN) 
by incorporating two additional extensions: (1) a colour assumes values from a 
Euclidean state space, its value evolves as solution of a differential equation and 
influences the time period between enabling and firing; (2) the new tokens and 
attached colours are produced as random functions of the removed tokens and 
colours. Subsequently, the DCPN has been further extended to a stochastically 
and dynamically coloured Petri net (SDCPN) by allowing a colour to evolve as a 
solution of a stochastic differential equation [44]. Also, it has been proven that 
an SDCPN-generated process (e.g. through Monte Carlo simulation) is 
mathematically equivalent to a GSHP [44]. Therefore SDCPN generated processes 
inherit the stochastic analysis power of GSHP as well as of stochastic hybrid 
automata [45]. This inheritance distinguishes SDCPN from various other hybrid 
Petri net modelling extensions, e.g. [34]. Finally, complementary SDCPN features 
have been developed [46] that allow a hierarchical and compositional approach in 
specifying a multi-agent model as an SDCPN.  
4.4 RARE EVENT MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF SDCPN 
Based on the SDCPN specification of the ABM, Monte Carlo simulation software is 
developed. Air traffic is a very safe means of transport and the probability of a 
collision between two aircraft is extremely low. The assessment of such low 
collision risk values through straightforward Monte Carlo simulation would need 
extremely lengthy computer simulation periods. Therefore, a speed-up method 
for Monte Carlo simulation of the SDCPN is required. For collision risk 
assessment in ATM, such speed-up has been achieved by risk decomposition and 
by an interacting particle system (IPS) approach, both of which are concisely 
explained next.  
 
Risk decomposition consists of decomposing accident risk simulations in a 
sequence of conditional Monte Carlo simulations and combining the results of 
these conditional simulations into the assessed collision risk value. The strong 
Markov property of an SDCPN generated process allows to properly estimate the 
conditional risk given a specific event sequence, (including dependent events) 
and the conditional probabilities of such event sequences [47].  
 
The IPS approach supports probability estimation of collision probability in ATM 
scenarios by introducing a sequence of intermediate aircraft encounter 
conditions that are always preceding a collision. The collision probability is 
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determined as the product of conditional probabilities of reaching these 
intermediate encounter conditions. The conditional probabilities are estimated by 
simulating in parallel several copies of the process, i.e. each copy is considered 
as a particle following the trajectory generated by the process dynamics [48]. 
Cerou et al. [49] have proven that under certain conditions this IPS approach 
yields unbiased risk probabilities, which distinguishes IPS from the popular 
Restart method [50]. The main condition that is required to ensure unbiased 
estimation, is that the simulated process must have the strong Markov property, 
which property holds true for the SDCPN generated GSHP [32, 33].   
4.5 EVALUATING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SDCPN BASED MODEL 
AND THE REAL OPERATION 
By the very nature of any model, there are differences between a real operation 
and a model of the operation. This means that the effects of these differences 
remain to be taken into account in the risk assessment. In the MA-DRM based 
risk assessment this is pursued by a systematic assessment of the bias and 
uncertainty in the risk that is expected to be inferred by potential differences 
between SDCPN based model and reality (Figure 4). 
MC simulation
of SDCPN
Bias & uncertainty 
assessment
Potential differences 
between model and reality 
Risk expected value
Risk uncertainty interval
Risk point estimates
Elasticities
Figure 4: In the MA-DRM based risk assessment, MC simulation of the SDCPN 
plays a dual role by providing risk point estimates and elasticities of the risk with 
respect to model parameter values. 
 
Figure 4 shows that rare event Monte Carlo simulation of the SDCPN is used for 
two purposes: 1) to assess the model based point estimate of the collision risk; 
and 2) to assess the model elasticities (log-sensitivities) from input to output. 
The assessed elasticity values are used to evaluate the impact on the assessed 
risk level of the differences between model and reality. The specific steps in the 
bias and uncertainty assessment are [51, 52]: 
1. Identify potential differences between model and reality. This concerns 
differences between: i)  the values assumed in the SDCPN simulation and the 
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real parameter values; ii) differences between SDCPN structure assumed and 
structure in reality; iii) differences due to hazards that are not modelled by 
the SDCPN; and iv) differences between the operational concept assumed in 
the SDCPN and the real operational concept. 
2. Assess the size/probability of the differences. For each parameter value a 
bias factor and a corresponding uncertainty interval and a bias factor are 
assessed. For other types of differences a value is assessed for the 
probability that the difference applies in the case considered. 
3. Assess the elasticity (log-sensitivity) of assessed risk level for changes in 
parameter values. Additional Monte Carlo simulations are conducted with 
the SDCPN in order to assess the elasticities (log-sensitivities) of the SDCPN 
assessed accident risk to changes in its parameter values. 
4. Assess the effect of each potential parameter value difference on the risk 
outcome. The bias and uncertainty interval of each parameter value are 
combined with the risk elasticities. In order to find the bias and uncertainty 
interval in the risk for the parameter value considered.  
5. Assess effect of the non-parameter differences. For the non-parameter types 
of differences, a conditional risk bias given the difference exists is assessed 
and this is combined with the probability that the difference exists. 
6. Determine the joint effect of all differences. The joint effect of all differences 
on the bias and uncertainty interval of the risk is determined [51, 52].  
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5 MA-DRM BASED SAFETY STUDY OF THE 
RUNWAY INCURSION SCENARIO 
This section describes the results obtained by the MA-DRM based safety 
assessment of the runway incursion scenario. Section 5.1 describes the SDCPN of 
the runway incursion scenario. Section 5.2 describes the accident risk results 
achieved using the MA-DRM based approach. Section 5.3 provides a further 
analysis of agent based events in Monte Carlo simulations of the SDCPN. Section 
5.4 describes an analysis of changes in risk results when one or several agents 
are placed out of the loop or monitoring roles. 
5.1 SDCPN MODEL OF THE RUNWAY INCURSION SCENARIO 
The main agents in the MA-DRM of the runway incursion scenario are the aircraft 
taking-off and taxiing, the pilots flying of the aircraft, the runway controller and 
the ATC system. These agents and the interactions between them are shown in 
Figure 5. A summary of the agents and illustrative examples of the associated 
SDCPN models are  provided next. 
 
Taking-off 
aircraft
Runway 
controller
Taxiing
aircraft
Pilot flying
taking-off 
aircraft
Pilot flying 
taxiing
aircraft
ATC system  
(Surveillance, 
Alerts, R/T)
 
Figure 5: Interactions between the agents of the MA-DRM of the runway 
incursion: aircraft, pilots flying, runway controller and ATC system.  
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5.1.1 TAKING-OFF AIRCRAFT (AC-TO)  
The model of the taking-off aircraft represents the ground run, airborne 
transition and airborne climb-out phases during takeoff and includes the 
possibility of a rejected takeoff. The aircraft initiates takeoff from a position near 
the runway threshold and it may be medium-weight or heavy-weight. Figure 6 
shows a part of the Petri Net for the evolution of the taking-off aircraft, which 
illustrates that the modes Ground Run may be followed by the modes Rejected 
Takeoff and Hold, or by the modes Airborne Transition and Airborne Climb-out, 
dependent on actions of the agent Pilot Flying Taking-off Aircraft. Examples of 
selected differential equations associated with these modes are: 
AC-TO AC-TO AC-TO AC-TO
AC-TO AC-TO AC-TO
AC-TO AC-TO
AC-TO
AC-TO AC-TO
cos cos
sin
0 if 
/ if  
ψ γ
γ
γ
=
=
=

= 





t t t t
t t t
t t
t
t t
x v
z v
v a
Ground Run
v R AirborneTransition
(2) 
where AC-TOtx  is the position along the runway of the aircraft, 
AC-TO
tz  is the vertical 
position of the aircraft, AC-TOtv  is the aircraft speed, 
AC-TO
tγ  is the flight-path 
angle, AC-TOtψ  is the heading, 
AC-TO
ta  is the acceleration and 
AC-TO
tR  is the flight-
path radius during airborne transition. In the model of the taking-off aircraft it 
has thus been assumed that the aircraft accelerates along the runway and moves 
along a circular flight-path during the airborne transition phase. 
 
Figure 6: Part of the Petri Net for the model of the trajectory of the taking-off aircraft.  
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5.1.2 TAXIING AIRCRAFT (AC-TX) 
The model of the taxiing aircraft represents aircraft movements during taxiing, 
including braking as a means to avoid a collision. The aircraft enters the taxiway 
leading to the runway crossing at a position close to the remotely controlled 
stopbar (see Figure 1), where its entrance time is uniformly distributed around 
the take-off time of AC-TO. The aircraft may be medium-weight or heavy-weight. 
5.1.3 ATC SYSTEM 
The model of the ATC system includes components for the surveillance system, 
the alert system and the R/T system.  
• The model of the surveillance system provides position and velocity 
estimates for both aircraft. There is a chance that the surveillance system is 
not available, resulting in track loss. Surveillance data is used by the ATC 
alert system.  
• A stopbar violation alert (SVA) becomes active if the surveillance data indicate 
that AC-TX has passed an active stopbar. A runway incursion alert (RIA) 
becomes active if the surveillance data indicate that AC-TX is within a critical 
distance of the runway centre-line and AC-TO has exceeded a velocity 
threshold in front of the runway crossing. There is a chance that the alerts 
are not well functioning.  
• The model for the R/T system between the runway controller and the aircraft 
crews accounts for the communication system of the aircraft, the 
communication system of the controller, the tower communication system 
and the frequency selection of the aircraft communication system. The 
nominal status of these communication systems accounts for direct non-
delaying communication. The model accounts for the chance of delay or 
failure of the communication systems. 
 
5.1.4 PILOT FLYING OF TAXIING AIRCRAFT (PF-TX) 
The model for the performance of PF-TX accounts for performance of tasks such 
as auditory monitoring, visual monitoring, crew coordination, aircraft control, 
and conflict detection and reaction. The model includes dynamic representations 
of situation awareness about AC-TO, AC-TX and controller calls, a cognitive 
control mode of the pilot and task scheduling by the pilot. In the conflict 
scenario considered, PF-TX intends to continue taxiing on a regular taxiway 
(whereas actually the aircraft is on the runway crossing). During taxiing PF-TX 
visually monitors the traffic situation. In particular, at stochastically distributed 
times visual,PF-TXkt : 
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visual visual interval-vis duration-vis
,PF-TX 1,PF-TX ,PF-TX ,PF-TXk k k kt t τ τ−= + +  (3) 
where 
interval-vis
,PF-TXkτ  is the interval to the previous visual monitoring action, which is 
chosen from an exponential probability distribution, and duration-vis,PF-TXkτ  is the duration 
of the visual monitoring action, which is chosen from a uniform probability 
distribution, the agent PF-TX updates situation awareness components:  
ˆAC-TO AC-TO AC-TO,
,PF-TX ,PF-TX
ˆAC-TO AC-TO AC-TO,
,PF-TX ,PF-TX
AC-TX AC-TX
,PF-TX
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
x
t t t
v
t t t
t t
x x
v v
y y
ε
ε
= +
= +
=
 (4) 
where 
AC-TO
,PF-TXˆtx  is the situation awareness about the position of AC-TO, 
AC-TO
,PF-TXtˆv  is 
the situation awareness about the speed of AC-TO, 
AC-TX
,PF-TXˆty  is the situation 
awareness about the position of the own aircraft and 
ˆAC-TO,
,PF-TX
x
tε  and 
ˆAC-TO,
,PF-TX
v
tε  are 
noise contributions in the position and speed estimation processes, respectively. 
Based upon the situation awareness, PF-TX detects a conflict if AC-TX is within a 
minimum distance of the runway, AC-TO approaches towards AC-TX and the 
speed of AC-TO exceeds a threshold value, or due to an R/T call of ATCo-R: 
,ATCo-R AC-TX confl
,PF-TX ,PF-TX PF-TX
conflict AC-TO det-TO AC-TO AC-TX
,PF-TX ,PF-TX PF-TX ,PF-TX ,PF-TX
ˆ ˆif ( ) {( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ    ( ) ( )}
else
t t
t t t t
Hold y d
Conflict
v v x x
NoConflict
ρθ
θ
 = ∨ <
=  ∧ > ∧ <


      (5) 
where ,ATCo-R,PF-TXtˆ
ρθ  is the situation awareness of a controller call, conflPF-TXd is a 
minimum distance to the runway and det-TOPF-TXv is  a minimum speed of AC-TO above 
which it is recognized as taking-off. Following conflict detection, PF-TX starts a 
full braking action unless AC-TX already is within a critical distance of the runway 
centre-line; otherwise it continues and may pass the runway in front of AC-TO. 
 
5.1.5 PILOT FLYING OF THE TAKING-OFF AIRCRAFT (PF-TO) 
The model structure of PF-TO is similar to that of PF-TX. Initially, PF-TO is aware 
that take-off is allowed and initiates a take-off. During the take-off, PF-TO visually 
monitors the traffic situation on the runway at stochastically distributed times. 
PF-TO may detect a conflict if AC-TX is observed to be within a critical distance of 
the runway or due to an R/T call by the runway controller (ATCo-R). Following 
conflict detection, PF-TO starts a collision avoiding braking action if it is 
expected that braking will stop AC-TO in front of AC-TX; otherwise it continues 
and may fly over AC-TX. 
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5.1.6 RUNWAY CONTROLLER (ATCO-R) 
The model for the performance of ATCo-R accounts for the performance of tasks 
such as visual monitoring, communication with aircraft crews, ATC coordination, 
and conflict detection and reaction. The model includes dynamic representations 
of the situation awareness about the aircraft and the alerts, a cognitive control 
mode and task scheduling. ATCo-R visually monitors the traffic situation on the 
runway and is supported by ATC alerts. ATCo-R may detect a safety-critical 
situation if AC-TX is observed to have passed the stopbar, or due to a stopbar 
violation alert, or due to a runway incursion alert. Following detection of the 
safety-critical situation, ATCo-R instructs both AC-TX and AC-TO to hold. 
 
5.2 ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS FOR THE RUNWAY 
INCURSION SCENARIO 
The Monte Carlo simulation software that was developed for the SDCPN model 
described above uses risk decomposition as MC simulation speed-up method. 
The particular conditions taken into account for this risk decomposition are [13]: 
• Type of each aircraft (medium-weight or heavy-weight). 
• Remotely controlled stopbar (functioning or not). 
• Communication systems (functioning or not). 
• ATC alert system (functioning or not). 
• Situation awareness of the PF-TX concerning allowance of runway crossing 
(allowed/not allowed). 
• Situation awareness of PF-TX concerning the next waypoint (taxiway/crossing). 
The risk assessment takes into account the risk contributions of combinations of 
these conditions and it includes an evaluation of conditional accident 
probabilities given each condition.  
 
For the comparison with the risk results of the event tree approach, we focus on 
the condition that the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft intends to proceed on a 
normal taxiway (i.e. without being aware to be heading to the runway crossing). 
In this situation the pilot of the taxiing aircraft starts to cross the runway without 
contacting the runway controller, which is the condition considered in the event 
sequence based risk assessment. For this condition a total of 73.9 10⋅  Monte 
Carlo simulations runs were done and a total of 7000 collisions were observed. 
The point estimate of the accident probability given the condition considered is 
41.8 10−⋅ . Given the large number of collisions observed in the Monte Carlo 
simulations, the statistical error in this point estimate is negligible. 
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In the bias and uncertainty assessment a total of 306 potential differences 
between model and reality were assessed, consisting of 175 parameter values 
and 131 other types. In support of this assessment, interviews with pilots and 
controllers were conducted about operational aspects, such as the way and 
timing of recognition of conflicts and subsequent actions [13]. The point 
estimate and 95% uncertainty interval of the conditional accident probability 
given the runway incursion scenario are shown in Figure 7. It also shows the 
conditional accident probability results achieved by the event tree based study. 
Full comparison of both approaches is done in Section 6.  
Figure 7: Conditional accident probability results of the event tree based study 
(lower/upper bound and geometric mean) and of the MA-DRM based study (95% 
uncertainty interval and point estimate). 
 
5.3 ANALYSIS OF AGENT BASED EVENTS IN THE RUNWAY INCURSION 
SCENARIO 
In the previous section we showed results for the accident risk and related 
sensitivity and uncertainty results. To improve the insight in the interactions 
between the agents in the MA-DRM, the relation of this performance with the 
accident risk and to support the comparison with the event sequence based 
analysis, we analyse event occurrences in the Monte Carlo simulations of the MA-
DRM. Descriptions of the defined events qE  are provided in Table 3. These 
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events consider conflict detection by the ATC alert system; conflict detection by 
the runway controller, either by own observation or via an alert of the ATC alert 
system; conflict detection by the pilots flying of each aircraft, either by own 
observation or via a call by the runway controller; braking actions by the pilots 
flying of each aircraft, and starts and ends of aircraft movements.  
 
Table 3: Description of events tracked in the Monte Carlo  
simulations of the MA-DRM. 
Event 
ID Description 
1E  PF-TO detects conflict 
1E ′  PF-TO detects conflict by own observation 
2E  PF-TO initiates rejected take-off (RTO) 
3E  PF-TX detects conflict 
3E ′  PF-TX detects conflict by own observation 
4E  PF-TX Initiates braking 
5E  ATCo-R detects conflict 
5E ′  ATCo-R detects conflict by own observation 
6E  ATCo-R warns PF-TO 
7E  ATCo-R warns PF-TX 
8E  Stopbar violation alert (SVA) is active 
9E  Runway incursion alert (RIA) is active 
10E  AC-TO starts takeoff run 
11E  AC-TO comes to stance 
12E  AC-TX starts taxiing 
13E  AC-TX comes to stance 
collE  Collision 
 
In a Monte Carlo simulation run, the time qτ  of the first occurrence of event qE , 
the time collτ  of a collision event collE  and the positions of both aircraft at the 
times qτ  and collτ  were recorded (when the events occurred). This provides 
information on the first times when the agents could become aware of the 
conflict and the resolution actions they could then implement. A total of 10 
million Monte Carlo simulation runs were performed for the condition that the 
pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft has the intent to proceed on a normal taxiway. 
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In these runs a total of 1809 collisions were counted, which is consistent with the 
risk point estimate of 41.8 10−⋅  for this condition as found earlier in Section 5.2.  
 
Figure 8 shows the events, the relations between the events and the event 
probabilities resulting from the Monte Carlo simulations of the MA-DRM. For each 
event, two probability results are shown: the unconditional probability of the 
event and the conditional probability given the occurrence of a collision. Almost 
all event probabilities shown in Figure 8 result from the interactions in the MA-
DRM and could not have been predicted a priori. Only the results for events 10E
and 12E were known before the MC simulations, as the modelled scenario 
considers the conflict between an aircraft taking-off with an aircraft taxiing, and 
the conditional probability of collE given a collision equals one by definition. Key 
observations and explanations of the results given in Figure 8 are provided next 
for each of the agents. 
Figure 8: Relations between and probability results of events in the MC simulations of the 
MA-DRM. For each event, the unconditional event probability and the conditional event 
probability given the occurrence of a collision are shown.   
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5.3.1 ATC ALERTS 
The stopbar violation alert is active (event 8E ) in 94.0% of all scenarios and in 
99.9% of the cases ending in a collision. Mostly, it is not activated in situations 
that AC-TX stops close after the stopbar, such that the alert threshold has not yet 
been passed. 
 
The runway incursion alert is active (event 9E ) in 34.1% of all scenarios and in 
99.9% of the cases ending in a collision. It is not activated in situations where AC-
TX taxies in front of AC-TO while it has not initiated take-off, or when AC-TX 
taxies after AC-TO has passed the crossing position. 
5.3.2 RUNWAY CONTROLLER (ATCO-R) 
ATCo-R detects the conflict (event 5E ) in 99.3% of all simulated conflict scenarios. 
Here, ATCo-R detects the conflict by own observation (event 5E ′ ) in 39.3% of all 
cases, whereas in the remaining 60.0% ATCo-R detects the conflict via the ATC 
alerting systems.  
 
In the simulation runs ending in a collision, ATCo-R detects the conflict (event 5E ) 
in 99.9% of these cases. Here, ATCo-R detects the conflict by own observation 
(event 5E ′ ) in 22.8% of these cases and via the ATC alert system in 77.1% of 
these cases. Thus for the conditional case given a collision it is found in 
hindsight that the probability of conflict detection by ATCo-R is considerably 
larger than in the unconditional case and the contribution of the ATC alert 
system to detection of the conflict by ATCo-R is somewhat higher than in the 
unconditional case. 
 
The controller warns the pilots of the aircraft (events 6E , 7E ) in 99.3% of all 
simulated conflict scenarios, which is equal to the detection rate by the controller 
(event 5E ). In the runs ending in a collision, the probability of a warning is 
decreased to 95.4% for PF-TO and to 56.9% for PF-TX. A factor contributing to the 
larger decrease for PF-TX is that in this conflict scenario PF-TX is not on the R/T 
frequency of ATCo-R and their communication is thus delayed. 
5.3.3 PILOT FLYING OF TAKING-OFF AIRCRAFT (PF-TO) 
PF-TO detects the conflict (event 1E ) in 99.2% of all simulated conflict scenarios. 
Here, PF-TO detects the conflict by own observation (event 1E ′ ) in only 4.2% of all 
cases, whereas in the remaining 95.0% of all cases PF-TO detects the conflict via 
ATCo-R. Although PF-TO is very frequently monitoring the traffic situation and 
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ATCo-R needs time to recognize the conflict and to warn PF-TO, the PF 
recognizes AC-TX as conflicting only if it is within a critical distance of 90 m to 
the runway centreline and ATCo-R can recognize AC-TX as conflicting as soon as 
it has passed the stopbar 
 
Of the simulation runs ending in a collision, in hindsight we observe that PF-TO 
detects the conflict (event 1E ) in 99.7% of these cases, PF-TO detects the conflict 
by own observation (event 1E ′ ) in 58.9% and via the controller in 40.8%. Thus for 
the conditional case given a collision it is found in hindsight that the probability 
of conflict detection by PF-TO is  higher than in the unconditional case and the 
contribution of ATCo-R to detection of the conflict by PF-TO is significantly lower 
than in the unconditional case. 
5.3.4 PILOT FLYING OF TAXIING AIRCRAFT (PF-TX) 
PF-TX detects the conflict (event 3E ) in 99.8% of all simulated conflict scenarios. 
Here, PF-TX detects the conflict by own observation (event 3E ′ ) in 22.1% of the 
cases, whereas in the remaining 77.7% of all cases PF-TX detects the conflict via 
ATCo-R. Although ATCo-R needs time to recognize the conflict and to warn PF-
TX, the PF detects the conflict situation if it is recognized that AC-TO is taking 
off, whereas ATCo-R can already recognize the conflict as soon as the taxiing 
aircraft has passed the stopbar.  
 
Of the simulation runs ending in a collision, in hindsight we can see that PF-TX 
detects the conflict (event 3E ) in 91.3% of these cases, PF-TX detects the conflict 
self (event 3E ′ ) in 75.1% and via the controller in 16.2%. Thus for the conditional 
case given a collision it is found in hindsight that the probability of conflict 
detection by PF-TX is considerably lower than in the unconditional case and the 
contribution of ATCo-R to detection of the conflict by PF-TX is also significantly 
lower than in the unconditional case.  
5.3.5 TAKING-OFF AIRCRAFT (AC-TO) 
PF-TO initiates a rejected take-off (RTO) (event 2E ) in 56.6% of all cases and also 
in 56.6% of all cases AC-TO comes to stance (event 11E ). For the cases ending in a 
collision, an RTO was initiated in 23.9% of the cases and the aircraft came to 
stance in 0.0% of the cases.  
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5.3.6 TAXIING AIRCRAFT (AC-TX) 
PF-TX initiates braking (event 4E ) in 68.8% of all cases and in 68.7% of all cases 
AC-TX comes to stance (event 13E ). In the cases that ended in a collision, braking 
was initiated in 71.3% of these cases and the aircraft came to stance in 29.5% of 
these cases.  
 
As indicated above, aircraft positions were recorded in the Monte Carlo 
simulations at the event times qτ . Based on this recorded data, Figure 9 and 
Figure 10 show empirical probability density functions (PDFs) of aircraft positions 
conditional on the occurrence of an event, or conditional on the occurrence of an 
event and a collision in the simulation run. Figure 9(a,b) shows that AC-TO is 
predominantly within the first 500 m of the runway when the conflict is detected 
by PF-TO or ATCo-R. In contrast, in the cases resulting in a collision (Figure 
9(c,d)) these events mostly occur when AC-TO is between 500 m and 1000 m. 
There is thus a considerable difference in the AC-TO position at the event 
occurrences for the conditional case given a collision versus the unconditional 
case. Figure 10(a) shows that AC-TX is often more than 100 m and almost always 
more than 50 m from the runway centre-line when PF-TX detects the conflict by 
own observation. In contrast, Figure 10(b) shows that it is quite likely that AC-TX 
is close or even past the runway centre-line at the time ATCo-R warns PF-TX. 
Figure 10(c,d) shows that in the cases which resulted in a collision, the taxiing 
aircraft is within a 100 m at the time of the event. There is an overlap in the 
cores of the PDFs for the same events in Figure 10, especially for Figure 10(b) 
and Figure 10(d).       
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Figure 9: PDFs of the position of the front-wheel of AC-TO along the runway given PF-TO 
detects the conflict by own observation (event 1E ′ , figures a and c) and given ATCo 
warns PF-TO(event 6E  , figures b and d). The upper figures (a and b) are unconditional 
PDFs, the lower figures (c and d) are PDFs given a collision occurred. The horizontal 
axes reflect the position w.r.t. the runway threshold in metres; the red line indicates the 
taxiway position (at 1000 m).  
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Figure 10: PDFs of the position of the front-wheel of AC-TX along the taxiway given PF-
TX detects the conflict by own observation (event 3′E , figures a and c) and given ATCo 
warns PF-TO(event 7E  , figures b and d). The upper figures (a and b) are unconditional 
PDFs, the lower figures (c and d) are PDFs given a collision occurred. The horizontal 
axes reflect the position w.r.t. the runway centre-line in metres; the red line indicates the 
runway centre.  
 
5.4 RISK EFFECTS DUE TO PLACING AGENTS OUT OF THE LOOP OR 
MONITORING ROLE 
The results of the analysis in the last section provided insight in the performance 
of the various agents in the runway incursion scenario and its relation with 
accident occurrence. These results were achieved in the setting that all agents 
perform in the scenario as described by the MA-DRM (Section 5.1). To better 
understand the potential of agents to restrict the risk increase in cases where the 
performance of other agents is affected, we performed additional Monte Carlo 
simulations in which we placed one or more agents out of the loop or monitoring 
role. This was done for all the agents that are capable of detecting a conflict, 
namely PF-TO, PF-TX, ATCo-R and ATC System. The conditions for placing these 
agents out of the loop or monitoring role are: 
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• PF-TX does not actively monitor the traffic situation visually, such that PF-TX 
may only detect and react to a conflict via a call of ATCo-R. PF-TX is thus 
placed out of the monitoring role. 
• PF-TO does not actively monitor the traffic situation visually, such that PF-TO 
may only detect and react to a conflict via a call of ATCo-R. PF-TO is thus 
placed out of the monitoring role. 
• ATCo-R cannot communicate with the pilots. ATCo-R is thus placed out of the 
loop. 
• ATC Alert System does not specify alerts. The ATC Alert System is thus placed 
out of the loop.  
These conditions refer to the situation at the start and during the runway 
incursion scenario and they are not assumed to hold prior to the occurrence of 
the runway incursion scenario. Note that for conditions where ATCo-R is out of 
the loop, it does not matter whether or not the ATC alerts are in the loop, as 
these can only be effective via ATCo-R.   
 
For all relevant combinations of agents in or out of the loop or monitoring role, 
the conditional collision risk given the runway incursion scenario was determined 
by Monte Carlo simulation. Figure 11 shows the conditional collision risks for all 
twelve relevant cases C1 to C12, and it shows risk factors with respect to the 
lowest risk as obtained for case C1. Next we discuss the key results of Figure 11 
and their relation with the results presented in Section 5.3.  
 
Figure 11 shows that the conditional collision risk varies in the range between 
41.8 10−⋅  and 29.4 10−⋅  depending on the agents that are in the loop or monitor 
role. In the extreme case that none of the agents would be actively involved in 
recognizing the conflict and avoiding a collision (case C12), the collision risk of 
the runway incursion scenario increases by a factor 522. In this case an accident 
is thus only prevented by chance, especially by the coincidental timing of the 
runway incursion with respect to the start of the take-off run.  
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Figure 11: Conditional collision risk results for various conditions with one or more agents 
in (filled box) or out of (open box) the loop or monitoring role for the runway incursion 
scenario. Results are shown for the relevant cases, with four to zero agents in the loop / 
monitoring role. The value on top of each bar is the risk increase factor with respect to 
case C1. Since ATCo-R being out of the loop implies that alerts are also out of the loop, 
there are twelve combinations.     
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario increases by a factor 1.06 if 
the ATC alert systems are not available (case C2). Stated differently, the presence 
of an ATC alert system barely reduces the collision risk. This is remarkable given 
the results for events 5E  and 5E ′  in Figure 8, which show that if the ATC alert 
system is available, it warns ATCo-R before ATCo-R detected the conflict by own 
observation in 60% of the cases. Although the ATC alert system thus effectively 
supports ATCo-R, the results for case C2 show that the agents can well cope 
without the alerting system. In particular, even though the controller now 
regularly recognizes the conflict later, the conflict recognition time by the 
controller and by the pilots is only affected to a limited extent, such that the risk 
is increased by a factor 1.06 only.    
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario increases by a factor 1.22 if 
ATCo-R is out of the loop (case C5). Thus the performance of ATCo-R in the 
resolution of the runway scenario has a small effect only on reducing the 
collision risk. This result may be seen as quite surprising, given the results for 
events 1E , 1E ′ , 3E and 3E ′  in Figure 8, which show that the controller warns the 
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pilots flying of the taking-off and taxiing aircraft in 95% and 78% of all cases 
before they have detected the conflict themselves. Notwithstanding this good 
performance of the controller, if the controller is placed out of the loop in the 
modelled scenario, pilots can mostly detect the conflict themselves and react 
timely to avoid a collision, such that the risk increase is small. 
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario is increased by a factor 1.89 
in the (hypothetical) case that PF-TO is  not actively monitoring the traffic 
situation, but might still be warned by ATCo-R (case C3). If in addition to the lack 
of monitoring by PF-TO, ATCo-R is out of the loop (case C10), then the risk is 
majorly higher by a factor 56 with respect to case C3. Figure 9 shows that ATCo-
R often warns PF-TO at an early stage, namely if AC-TO is well within the first 500 
m of the runway. This early stage warning implies that ATCo-R can considerably 
restrict the risk increase of a non-monitoring PF-TO, as is manifest from the 
comparison of the risk factors in cases C3 and C10.     
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario is increased majorly by a 
factor 56.6 in the (hypothetical) case that PF-TX is not actively monitoring the 
traffic situation, but might still be warned by ATCo-R (case C4). If in addition to 
the lack of monitoring by PF-TX, ATCo-R is out of the loop (case C11), then the 
risk increases by a factor 1.7 with respect to case C4. Figure 10 shows that AC-
TX is often close to the runway when ATCo-R warns PF-TX. This implies that 
warnings of ATCo-R to PF-TX are often too late to prevent AC-TX entering a 
collision-critical area. Therefore, ATCo-R can barely restrict the risk increase due 
to a non-monitoring PF-TX, as is manifest from the comparison of the risk factors 
in cases C4 and C11.   
 
The collision risk of the runway incursion scenario is increased majorly by a 
factor 94.4 in the case that only ATCo-R would be monitoring (while supported 
by the ATC alert system) and the pilots of both aircraft would not be monitoring, 
but may be warned by ATCo-R (case C8). The attained risk level is similar to the 
other cases where only one human operator is actively monitoring the traffic 
situation (cases C10 and C11). It shows that only one human actively monitoring 
human cannot effectively restrict the risk increase due to the malperformance of 
other operators.    
 
Cases C6, C7 and C9 represent situations where the ATC alert system is not 
available and also one or both of the pilots flying are not actively monitoring the 
traffic situation. It follows from comparison with the similar cases including the 
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ATC alert system (i.e. cases C3, C4 and C8, respectively) that the effect of the 
non-availability of the ATC alert systems varies a lot.  
• In the cases without active monitoring by PF-TX (C7 versus C4) the risk 
increases by a factor 1.2 only, indicating that the alerts are often too late to 
warn the PF-TX.  
• In the cases without active monitoring by PF-TO (C6 versus C3) the risk 
increases by a factor 6, indicating that in this context the ATC alerts often 
warn ATCo-R such that ATCo-R can timely warn PF-TO.  
• In the cases without monitoring by both pilots (C9 versus C8) a risk increase 
by a factor 2 is achieved, which is intermediate between the above indicated 
values.  
These results indicate that the potential effectiveness of the ATC alert system can 
be better than the factor 1.06 found in case C2 if one or both pilots 
underperform. In the context given it is most important for timely warning of PF-
TO.   
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6 COMPARISON OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
STUDIES 
In Sections 3 and 5 we presented the methods and key results of safety 
assessments for a particular runway incursion scenario by event tree and MA-
DRM based approaches. The studies are contrasted in this section. This 
comparison and evaluation is structured according to the following aspects: 
• Comparison of the architecture of the models: 
− Model complexity: what are the levels of complexity of the models? 
− Dynamics: how are the dynamics of sociotechnical systems represented? 
− Performance variability: how is the variability in the performance of 
humans and technical systems in a sociotechnical system dealt with? 
− Interactions/concurrency: how are interactions and concurrency of the 
performance of entities in a sociotechnical system dealt with? 
− Emergent behaviour: to what extent is emergent behaviour in the 
sociotechnical system considered? 
• Comparison of the use of the models: 
− Expertise and techniques needed: what kinds of expertise and techniques 
are required? 
− Variety of contextual conditions: how are various contextual conditions 
dealt with? 
− Transparency: what is the level of transparency of the methods and 
results of the safety assessments? 
− Uncertainty: does the estimated uncertainty interval incorporate all 
uncertainties? 
• Comparison of the risk results obtained: 
− Differences in findings: are there significant differences in the safety risk 
assessment results obtained? 
− Comparison against real data: to what extend is it possible to compare 
the results obtained against real data? 
− Feedback to design: are there significant differences in the type of 
feedback that can be provided to the design of the active runway crossing 
operation? 
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6.1 COMPARISON OF THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MODELS 
6.1.1 MODEL COMPLEXITY 
The event tree is represented in a single figure (Figure 2) and can be 
straightforwardly understood by a large audience with only some basic 
background in risk models. Obviously, the model complexity of this event tree is 
relatively low. 
 
The architecture of the MA-DRM addresses various modelling levels. At a high 
level it considers the agents and the interactions between agents (see Figure 5); 
this level is easily understood. At a low level, the details of the SDCPN 
specification are described (see Sections 4.3 and 5.1), including the modes, 
stochastic dynamics and interactions of the agents. This level describes the 
details of the complexity encountered in the runway incursion scenario. At this 
detailed level, the model complexity of the MA-DRM is high.  
6.1.2 DYNAMICS 
In the event tree based study, the dynamics of the runway incursion scenario are 
represented by 27 possible sequences of 12 events 1Q  to 12Q  (Figure 2), where it 
is assumed that higher-indexed events do not occur before lower-indexed events. 
The event tree uses three time ranges for recognition and resolution of the 
conflict: early, medium and late. 
 
In the MA-DRM based study, the dynamics of the runway incursion scenario are 
represented by the dynamically interacting agents. Following the SDCPN 
specification (Sections 4.3 and 5.1), the dynamics evolve from the differential 
equations of token colours and the dynamics of the token transitions between 
places. Examples of the dynamics are the movements of the aircraft, the 
updating of the situation awareness of the pilots and controller and the timing of 
failures of technical systems. In contrast with the event tree there are no fixed 
sequences for conflict detection and resolution related events. Rather these 
events develop in the Monte Carlo simulations of the SDCPN. 
6.1.3 PERFORMANCE VARIABILITY 
In the event tree based study, the variability in the performance of mechanisms 
for the recognition and resolution of the runway incursion scenario is completely 
defined by the structure of the event tree and the (conditional) probabilities of its 
events. In particular, the conditional probabilities define the level of effectiveness 
that a particular event can resolve the conflict or not, conditional on earlier 
events in the event tree. 
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In the MA-DRM based study, performance variability concerns the performance of 
individual agents, the interactions between agents and the overall performance 
variability of the multi-agent system. The performance of individual agents and 
agents’ interactions are defined in the SDCPN based model, e.g. the timing of 
task performance by human operators, noise components in visual observation 
of an aircraft position by human operators, probabilistic errors in communication 
between pilot and controller, noise in radar surveillance systems, and variation in 
deceleration profiles of aircraft. The overall performance variability of the multi-
agent system arises from the Monte Carlo simulations of the SDCPN. 
6.1.4 INTERACTIONS / CONCURRENCY 
The event tree based study combines the mechanisms to detect a conflict and 
avoid a collision at three stages, leading to the 27 different cases of Figure 2. In 
the quantification of the effectiveness of each of these mechanisms their 
interactions must be accounted for. For instance in Figure 2, the occurrence of 
event 4Q  is conditional on the occurrence of 0Q  and the non-occurrence of 1Q , 
2Q  and 3Q , meaning that the alert system may warn the controller at an early 
stage, if and only if: i) there is an aircraft crossing while it should not; and ii) 
there is an aircraft in take-off; and iii) the conflict has not been recognized and 
resolved at an early stage by the pilots; and iv) the controller has not yet 
recognized the conflict. These types of nested relations get more complicated as 
one progresses along the event tree.  Even with the limited number of sequences, 
this makes an appropriate modelling of the dependencies between the events a 
very difficult task. 
 
The MA-DRM of the runway incursion scenario describes the performance of 
agents, including nominal and non-nominal performance modes, and the 
interactions between agents by the SDCPN formalism. As such it represents a 
broad variety of dynamic and stochastic hybrid processes in a more direct way. 
Examples of performance modes include particular tasks of pilots and controller 
or failure modes of technical systems. Examples of interactions between agents 
are observation of aircraft positions by pilots or communication between 
controller and pilots. In an SDCPN based model only a limited number of such 
performance modes, contextual conditions, stochastic dynamics and agents’ 
interactions have to be defined in order to capture an in principle infinite variety 
of potential event sequences. Through running Monte Carlo simulations with the 
SDCPN model, random samples are drawn from this large variety of potential 
event sequences.   
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6.1.5 EMERGENT BEHAVIOUR 
There are various views on emergent behaviour, see [53] for a recent overview 
including a discussion of their applicability to air traffic. Here, we evaluate 
emergence according to the definitions of Bedau [54],  Corning [55] and 
Chalmers [56]. In the event tree, the probabilities of the end events (e.g. 
incidents/accidents) are calculated straightforwardly and they are qualities of the 
same kind as the data used to obtain them: both are event probabilities. The 
evaluation of risk by these types of models does not require the type of 
simulation as described by Bedau [54] in his definition of weak emergence, nor 
can they be considered to be qualitative novelties and synergistic wholes 
composed of things of unlike kind as in the definition of emergence of Corning 
[55], nor can they be considered emerging truths that are unexpected given the 
principles governing the low-level domain as expressed in the definition of weak 
emergence by Chalmers [56]. In conclusion, the assessed risk level is not an 
emergent property in the event tree based approach. 
 
In the MA-DRM based study, the assessed risk level emerges from the MC 
simulations of the MA-DRM. In line with the definition of weak emergence by 
Bedau [54], risk is a macrostate that can be inferred by simulation of the 
microdynamics of the MA-DRM. In line with the definition of Corning [55] risk is 
an emergent property, since it is a qualitative novelty of a completely different 
nature of the traffic scenario considered and it is obtained by combined effects 
of various elements (agents). In line with the definition of weak emergence of 
Chalmers [56], risk is a high-level phenomenon that arises from the low-level 
domain (i.e. the varying performance of the agents). In conclusion, the 
performance variability of the agents and interactions between the agents lead to 
emergent behaviour of the multi-agent system and to the assessed risk level as 
an emergent property in the MA-DRM based approach.   
 
6.2 COMPARISON OF THE USE OF THE MODELS 
6.2.1 EXPERTISE AND TECHNIQUES NEEDED 
Both approaches have in common that safety analysis requires access to multi-
disciplinary knowledge regarding the technical systems, human operators, 
environmental influences and the interactions between these entities. Also 
common is the expertise used at the initial phase of safety assessment of the 
runway incursion scenario. This consists of in-depth learning about the specifics 
of the ATC case considered, including identification of potential hazards. Part of 
this is done through collecting expert information from controllers, pilots and 
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the experts of the various technical systems. However, after this initial learning 
phase, there are significant differences between the two approaches.  
 
In the event sequence based approach, the collected information is analysed and 
subsequently synthesized into a manageable number of potential event 
sequences. For socio-technical systems this analysis/synthesis process is an art 
rather than a science. This also means that the development of the event 
sequence tree for a socio-technical system is typically done through several 
iterations. Once the event tree has been frozen, the follow-up step is to collect 
data for the estimation of the various conditional event probabilities in the tree. 
For frequent events, data often is available to estimate these probabilities. For 
less frequent events, however, typically interviews with controllers and pilots 
form the main source of data collection.  
 
The analysis and synthesis of the Petri net model and the running of rare event 
Monte Carlo simulations differ very much the event sequence based approach. 
The key difference is that there is no longer the need to think about the various 
combinations of dynamics and events that might happen. A Petri net based 
modelling approach allows to develop the model in a compositional way, agent 
by agent. The synthesis of the potential combinations of event sequence is 
simply left to the Monte Carlo simulator. Obviously, the development of an MA-
DRM based safety risk assessment requires knowledge on capturing agent type 
specific background in a SDCPN model, and in running efficient Monte Carlo 
simulation, including the use of dedicated speed-up techniques to capture rare 
events. 
6.2.2 VARIETY OF CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS 
In the event tree based study, the structure of the event tree and the conditional 
probabilities of its events are derived for the particular contextual conditions 
considered, such as good visibility and the use of a runway incursion alert 
system. A change in such contextual conditions would imply changes in the 
event tree structure and parameterization. The event tree approach does not 
provide ways to easily reassess the structure and parameter values to account for 
varieties of contextual conditions.  
 
In the MA-DRM based study, contextual conditions are often defined through 
model parameters for various agent entities. For instance, as shown in [13], the 
visibility condition for human operators is included in the SDCPN based model 
for the runway incursion case by a visibility distance parameter. As another 
example, in this study we analysed the effect of excluding a runway incursion 
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alert system in the operation simply by removing the possibility of these alerts to 
occur. The risk effects of such changes are the resultant of the agents’ 
interactions and do not need to be pre-specified on the level of event 
probabilities as in an event tree based study.        
6.2.3 TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is an important quality in risk assessment, and includes the 
following three complementary aspects:  
a) Transparency of the development of the risk model architecture, 
b) transparency of the quantification of the risk models, 
c) transparency of the output generated by the risk models.   
These three transparency aspects are compared for the event tree and MA-DRM 
based approaches for the example considered. 
 
Transparency of the development of the risk model architecture 
During the development of the event tree various choices were made regarding 
the types of events, dependencies between events and the ordering of events. 
Typically, these choices seem a bit arbitrary, in the sense that other choices 
might as well have been made.  
 
In the MA-DRM based study, an SDCPN model has been specified, which includes 
explicit representation of modes, dynamics and interactions of the agents. 
During this  development, assumptions regarding the specific modelling choices 
made were explicitly formulated. In contrast with the event tree development, no 
specification of event orderings had to be developed; the various event orderings 
emerged from the Monte Carlo simulations. Consequently, the SDCPN 
development process  is more structured and transparent than it is for the event 
tree. 
 
Transparency of the quantification of the risk models 
In the event tree study, quantification means adopting values for the event 
probabilities and this was achieved by expert (controller and pilot) elicitation for 
the case studied. As argued above under the heading of interactions, the event 
probabilities are conditional upon events earlier in the event tree and 
appropriately accounting for these dependencies is ambiguous. Typically no clear 
argumentation was provided for the conditional event probabilities. Similar 
difficulties exist in accounting for the effect of contextual conditions on the 
event probabilities, such as argued above under the heading contextual 
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conditions. In conclusion, the quantification in the event tree approach is not 
transparent. 
 
In the MA-DRM approach, quantification means adopting values for a wide range 
of parameters for the agent models developed. Above, under the heading of 
performance variability, several examples are provided of agent aspects for 
which parameter values have been specified. These parameters typically have a 
physical meaning that is dedicated for each of type of agent modelled. Part of 
these model parameters (e.g. aircraft performance) could be quantified quite 
accurately, the quantification of other model parameters (e.g. human related) 
involved more uncertainty. Because an SDCPN based model is nearer to capturing 
the physical aspects of a scenario than the event tree model, the quantification of 
its parameters is more objective and transparent than the quantification of the 
ambiguous conditional event probabilities in the event tree. 
 
Transparency of the output generated by the risk models 
The results of the event tree are the probabilities of incidents and accidents 
resulting from the runway incursion scenario. Given the event tree architecture 
and quantification, these results are calculated straightforwardly in a manner that 
can easily be checked by others.  
 
The results of the MA-DRM based risk assessment are (conditional) accident risk 
probabilities, the risk uncertainty range, risk sensitivities of the parameters, 
(conditional) probabilities of agent performance-related events, (conditional) 
probability density functions of agent performance variables and risk 
probabilities of dedicated cases with agents being in or out of the loop or 
monitoring role. These results were achieved by Monte Carlo simulations of the 
MA-DRM and the associated bias & uncertainty assessment Figure 4. The results 
are thoroughly documented and can thereby be checked or repeated by others.   
   
6.2.4 UNCERTAINTY 
For the event tree, the estimated uncertainty interval accounts for uncertainties 
in the estimated probabilities used in the numerical evaluation of the event tree. 
However, uncertainty regarding potentially missing safety critical event 
sequences and regarding lack of knowledge on dependencies between event 
probabilities are not taken into account.    
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In the MA-DRM based approach, sequences of events leading to accidents follow 
from the rare event Monte Carlo simulation rather than from pre-specification of 
limited set of sequences. Moreover, in the MA-DRM based approach potential 
differences between the model and the real operation are taken into account 
through a systematic assessment of the effects of these differences on the 
estimated safety risk. For the latter estimation explicit use is made of the 
assessed sensitivities of the risk to changes in the physical parameters of the 
model.  
 
6.3 COMPARISON OF THE RISK RESULTS OF THE MODELS 
6.3.1 DIFFERENCES IN FINDINGS 
Figure 7 shows that the accident risk was assessed to be considerably lower by 
the event tree based assessment in comparison with the MA-DRM based 
assessment. In particular the mean risk assessed by the event tree approach is a 
factor 82 below the risk point estimate of the MA-DRM approach. Moreover, 
comparison of results of Figure 3 and Figure 11 shows that the differences in 
risk reduction factors by the agents are even larger. The combined action of 
pilots, controller and ATC alert system was assessed to reduce the accident risk 
by a factor 115,000 in the event tree based approach (case B8), whereas the risk 
reduction factor following the MA-DRM based approach is limited to 522 (case 
C12). The risk reduction by the ATC alert system was assessed to be a factor 19 
by the event tree based approach (case B2) versus only a factor 1.06 by the MA-
DRM based approach (case C2). This small factor is striking, since the MA-DRM 
based results in Figure 8 show that in about 94% of the runway incursion 
scenarios at least one of the alert types is active and in 60% of the scenarios the 
alert system warns the controller before (s)he has detected the conflict 
independently. In spite of this alert activity, the pilots are mostly able to timely 
detect the conflict themselves and to avoid a collision independent of the ATC 
alert system. This relationship has not been captured in the event tree based 
assessment. A similar situation exists for the risk reduction by the alert-
supported controller, which was assessed to be a factor 44.5 by the event tree 
based approach (case B5 in Figure 3), but only a factor 1.22 by the MA-DRM 
based approach (case C5 in Figure 11). The additional results in Figure 8 show 
that the controller detects the conflict and warns the pilots in 99.3% of the cases 
and that in 95% and 78% of the cases the controller is able to warn the pilots 
flying of the taking-off or taxiing aircraft, respectively, before the pilots have 
detected the conflict independently. In spite of this laudable performance of the 
controller in the model, the accident risk would only increase by a factor 1.22 if 
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the controller would not play a role at all in the resolution of the runway 
incursion scenario. This limited capability of the controller to avoid the 
occurrence of an accident is illustrated by the decrease in the probability that the 
controller is able to warn the pilots prior to detection of the conflict by the pilots 
themselves from 95% to 41% (taking-off aircraft) and from 78% to 16.2% (taxiing 
aircraft) for the simulation runs that ended in an accident (Figure 8). These types 
of results follow from the MA-DRM based approach by considering the totality of 
the performance and interactions of all agents in huge numbers of simulations. 
Such relationships have not been captured in the event tree based study.  
6.3.2 COMPARISON AGAINST REAL DATA 
Although runway incursion data are gathered and analysed as part of safety 
management in ATC [57], the number of resulting collisions is (fortunately) far 
too low for statistically meaningful comparison at the level of conditional 
collision risk results for a runway incursion scenario. This applies to both safety 
assessment approaches. However, for various submodels of the total model, 
comparison against real data often is feasible. The latter is easier for the MA-
DRM approach because this simply asks for conducting Monte Carlo simulations 
with a part of the complete SDCPN, and subsequently to compare the results 
obtained with real data obtained for the subsystem considered. Such a localized 
comparison is not feasible for an event sequence based approach.      
6.3.3 FEEDBACK TO DESIGN 
The results of the event tree study are the risk levels and the main events 
contributing to these risk levels. As has been explained in [14], the assessed risk 
levels were  possibly unacceptable in the event tree based study and hazards 
contributing to these risk levels include pilots’ selection of an incorrect R/T 
frequency and unavailability of the R/T frequency.  
 
The feedback to the design provided by the MA-DRM based safety assessment is 
more diverse than that of the event tree analysis. As the SDCPN based model 
represents the dynamic performance of interacting agents rather than merely the 
occurrence of events, the feedback to the design reflects this rich variety of 
performance aspects. For instance, the feedback includes the unexpected  
ineffectiveness of the ATC alert system, the sensitivity of the risk for system 
settings (e.g. alert threshold and system availability settings), and the 
contributions of human operators to reducing the accident risk in the runway 
incursion scenario.  
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7 DISCUSSION 
In this paper we compared risk assessment studies of a particular runway 
incursion scenario by an event tree based approach versus a MA-DRM based 
approach. This comparison was done at a qualitative level as well as for the 
particular quantitative differences attained. Already at a qualitative level it has 
been shown that for the considered runway incursion scenario the event tree 
based risk model has clear limitations with regard to the representation of the 
dynamics in the scenario, the interactions between agents, the variability of the 
contextual conditions in, and the variability of the performance of the agents. As 
a result of these limitations the event tree approach lacks transparency of the 
development of the risk model, the quantification of the event probabilities, the 
risk results and the feedback to the design. In contrast, the MA-DRM uses direct 
representations and parameterization of the dynamics, agents’ interactions, 
performance variability and contextual conditions, and as a result attains a better 
transparency for the development of the risk model, the quantification of its 
parameters, the explanation of its results and the feedback to design.  
 
At a quantitative level, we showed that the differences in the event tree and MA-
DRM based approaches gave rise to considerably lower estimates of the accident 
risk and considerably higher estimates of the risk reduction by the ATC alert 
system, as assessed by the event tree approach in comparison with the MA-DRM 
approach. In addition, the quantitative results of the MA-DRM based study made 
clear that the level of risk is not manifest from the performance of individual 
human operators and technical systems, nor from the sole relations between 
human operators and/or technical systems, but from the totality of the 
performance and interactions of all human operators and technical systems in 
the operational context considered. This was clearly illustrated for the 
performance of the air traffic controller in the MA-DRM based study of the 
runway incursion scenario. Even though the controller very often warns the pilots 
and frequently does so before the pilots detected the conflict themselves, still 
the risk increases to a small extent only if the controller would be out of the 
loop. The performance and interactions between the remaining agents in this 
case effectively compensate for the lack of controller warnings and restrict the 
risk increase. The quantitative accident results, which show that safety is the 
resultant of the totality of the performance and interactions between human 
operators and technical systems in the operational context considered, are well 
in line with similar qualitative arguments in the safety literature [1-4].     
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The emergent behaviour observed in the Monte Carlo simulations means that in 
assessing the contributions for prevailing accidents by interviewing single 
operators (pilots and controllers) and by judging their contributions, it is difficult 
to account for the dependencies of the interactions in conflict scenarios. For 
instance, based on controller interviews in the event tree based study it was 
assessed that the controller, when supported by an ATC alert system, would have 
a large effect on reducing the accident risk of the runway incursion scenario. 
However, for a controller it is not well possible to judge the probability that a 
controller warning reaches the pilots before they have detected the conflict 
independently. Even more difficult is the estimation by a controller of the 
accident risk reduction of a controller warning, since it supposes an evaluation of 
all other possibilities by other agents to detect and resolve the conflict scenario. 
It is well known that expert elicitation for properly accounting of dependencies in 
risk analysis is a major problem [58] and the event tree based results confirm 
this problem.  
 
The contrast between the seemingly good performance of a human operator and 
the limited effect of this performance on the accident risk in a conflict scenario 
has been found by the Monte Carlo simulations of the MA-DRM based study only. 
This poses limitations on the safety conclusions that can be attained by other 
types of simulations. In the air traffic control domain, new concepts are regularly 
evaluated by human-in-the-loop simulations, in which the performance of (real) 
air traffic controllers is evaluated in a simulated environment. For operations on 
the airport this is done in tower simulators, where simulated aircraft movements 
on the aerodrome are projected in a 360 degrees view, the controllers are 
supported by their usual ATC systems (which may include alerts) and the 
controllers can communicate with pseudo-pilots who control the movements of 
the simulated aircraft. The numbers of aircraft handled in such simulations are 
similar to what can be achieved in reality, e.g. a runway controller may handle 
about 25 to 40 aircraft per hour. Human-in-the-loop simulation experiments 
typically last several days and often aim to evaluate several configurations, 
typically leading to some hundreds of aircraft handled in a particular 
configuration. In human-in-the-loop simulations occasionally conflict scenarios 
may be instantiated and the effectiveness of a controller to detect the conflict 
and warn pilots may be evaluated. However, the results of this paper indicate 
that performance measurement of human operators in real-time simulations say 
little about their contributions to reduction in the accident risk of air traffic 
scenarios. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical result of a human-in-the-loop 
simulation experiment that a controller is able to warn the pilots in conflict 
situations in the large majority of conflicts (say 95%). This might be interpreted 
as an indication that the controller is contributing considerably to avoiding 
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accidents, thus forming an important safety barrier. However, the presented 
results provide an example where the controller warns the pilots in 99% of the 
cases and still the accident risk would increase only slightly without any 
contributions of the controller due to the performance of the other agents in the 
operation. More in general, the results of this paper indicate that if the number 
of simulations is not sufficiently large to estimate the accident risk in a conflict 
scenario, it is hard to judge from the performance of individual agents what their 
effect on safety at the level of accident risk may be. 
 
In conclusion, for the runway incursion scenario example, this paper has 
confirmed by quantitative accident risk results of the MA-DRM based approach, 
the in the literature developed qualitative argumentation that safety of a complex 
socio-technical system is the resultant of the totality of the performance and 
interactions between human operators and technical systems in the operational 
context considered.  More specifically, it has been shown that the MA-DRM based 
approach resolves a considerable number of problems that are not well captured 
by an event sequence based approach. The findings also have significant 
ramifications for the evaluation and testing of novel air traffic operations: 
commonly applied analysis processes, such as human-in-the-loop simulations, 
model development, model validation and feedback to design, appear to have a 
serious lack in capturing the safety related impacts of interactions between the 
multiple agents involved in such novel operations. 
 
Now that it has been shown that the MA-DRM safety assessment approach  
evaluates many safety effects in the runway incursion scenario considered that 
are not are not evaluated by an event sequence based approach, there is good 
reason to continue research and development of this approach. Main on-going 
research directions are: 
• To further increase the power of ABM in modelling hazards, which now have 
to be assessed through bias and uncertainty assessment, e.g. hazards related 
to complacency, trust, organizational changes and negotiation processes [59, 
60].  
• To further develop methods for accelerating rare event Monte Carlo 
simulations [61-63].  
• To continue the development of the TOPAZ toolset in support of conducting 
MA-DRM safety risk assessment for advanced air traffic scenarios, e.g. [64-
66]. 
• To develop an informatics environment in support of the further development 
of novel TOPAZ toolsets for air traffic scenarios. This should include 
systematic support in SDCPN specification and Monte Carlo simulation code 
generation. 
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